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MEXICO'S ENERGY REGIME REFORMS:
MITIGATION, AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION

RESCISSION

RISK,

INTRODUCTION
In July 2017, an international consortium of energy companies from the United States, Mexico, and the United Kingdom
announced a significant crude oil discovery in shallow waters off the east coast of Mexico. 1 This discovery is not only
the fifth largest global oil discovery in the last five years and perhaps one of the top shallow-water fields discovered in
the past twenty years, but, as “‘the first offshore exploration well drilled by the private sector in Mexico's history[,]”’ it
has historical significance as well. 2
This important find was made possible pursuant to recent landmark reforms to Mexico's energy legal regime that now
allow foreign investors to participate in Mexico's energy sector. 3 Prior to these reforms, Mexico's energy industry was
among the most tightly controlled in the world, closely associated with national sovereignty. 4 Indeed, many consider the
*150 Mexican petroleum expropriation of 1938 to be “the apogee of Mexican resource nationalism ... [and] a patriotic
triumph” that is celebrated as Oil Expropriation Day, a national holiday, each March 18th. 5
Resource nationalism, sometimes expressed in its extreme form as expropriation, is a systemic risk for private
international oil companies. 6 Given the historical precedent in Mexico for the use of expropriation within the energy
sector, and with the recent upsurge in expropriations of foreign-owned oil assets in Bolivia, Ecuador, Russia, and
Venezuela, 7 the Mexican government's approach to dispute resolution was a critical factor for foreign investors eager
to take advantage of the Mexican energy reforms. While the reform package does authorize parties to exploration and
production (E&P) contracts to agree upon alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, including arbitration, 8 it also
contains a controversial unilateral rescission exception that could greatly impact foreign investors. 9
This article will briefly review the history of oil production in Mexico and the governing legal regime in Part I, and in
Part II, the recent reforms to that regime thereto. Part III will consider the reform's dispute resolution *151 provisions
and administrative rescission. Part IV will offer possible mechanisms by which foreign investors might mitigate the risk
of administrative rescission to protect their investment in the Mexican energy sector. The final reflections of this article
will focus upon the status and current success of Mexico's attempts to attract large international companies to invest
significant amounts of capital and assets into Mexico's energy industry, despite concerns related to unilateral rescission.
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I. HISTORY
A. Oil Production: Mexican Patrimony
Oil production is part of Mexico's cultural heritage. 10 Beginning with the Mayans and Aztecs, 11 and with the
introduction of commercialized oil production in the mid-19th century, 12 hydrocarbons have become some of Mexico's
most important natural resources and a source of enormous national pride. 13 Article 27 of the nation's Constitution
enshrines the value of the industry, reserving to “the Mexican nation alone [the authority to] carry out all actions
pertaining to the oil and gas industry without any work being performed by private companies,” as well as granting to
“the people of Mexico all water and land, including mineral rights.” 14
Prior to 1938, however, foreign investors had been permitted to produce oil in Mexico. 15 In fact, leading up to the
mid-20th century, approximately ninety percent of the oil production in Mexico came from subsidiaries of two large
foreign companies, both of which exist in some form today and are still key figures in the energy industry. 16
*152 The oil and gas industry in Mexico grew at a substantial rate, and in the 1920s, Mexico became the second largest
producer of oil in the world. 17 Yet, political unrest and animosity towards the large foreign oil companies mounted
within Mexico; foreign producers exported the vast majority of the oil, retaining only a small fraction of the profits from
their Mexican production within the country's borders. 18
These issues reached a boiling point when Mexican labor unions sought higher wages from the foreign oil producers. 19
In 1938, Mexico's President, Lazaro Cårdenas, attempted to negotiate a settlement between striking oil workers and the
oil companies. However, after the oil companies rejected settlement attempts and ignored both a government commission
and an order from the Mexican Supreme Court, President Cårdenas expropriated the assets of these foreign oil companies
through a decree dated March 18, 1938. 20 Mexico eventually agreed to compensate most of the companies with assets
seized by the government, and conventional wisdom is that Mexico “did not pay the full value of the oil deposits .... In
fact, [it compensated] only a third of total property values[.]” 21
Following the expropriation of these assets, Mexico's State-owned oil company, Petróleos Mexicanos, more commonly
referred to as Pemex, 22 was established. 23 After the creation of Pemex, and until the reforms in 2013, Mexico relied
almost completely upon Pemex for the exploration, production, and distribution of oil and gas within Mexico and upon
the revenue from its export. 24
*153 B. Toward Reform
Despite what one academic has called the nation's “Pemex Pride,” or the symbiotic relationship between oil and Mexican
national identity, 25 steep declines in oil production, weak gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the Mexican
economy, and years of capital underinvestment coupled with a lack of available capital 26 put pressure on the government
to reconsider its restrictive legal regime in order to attract foreign investment and capital to the energy industry. During
the latter part of the 1990s, serious discussions began regarding private company participation in the energy industry. 27
These discussions started to gain traction.
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The discussions led to actual change in 2008 when the Mexican government modified its regulations to permit Pemex to
enter into “integrated service contracts” with private companies. 28 The incentives in these integrated service contracts
were limited to bonus payments based upon predefined production targets: standard industry contracts, concessions,
and production/profit sharing agreements were still prohibited. 29 Although these modifications were significant as they
reflected a paradigm shift in the government's approach to its energy resources, they had limited impact, largely because
they failed to address the need for more meaningful private company incentives and involvement in both upstream and
downstream activities. 30
It became clear that more significant reform might be required when, in 2004, the amount of oil and natural gas produced
in Mexico began to fall, with oil production ultimately declining by approximately one million barrels per day. 31 This
drop in production was not due solely to a lack of demand as there was, simultaneously, an increase of oil imports into
Mexico. 32 By 2012, nearly half of the oil in Mexico was imported, nearly double that imported in the late 1990s. 33
*154 Decreasing Pemex revenues also drove the reform agenda. Capital constraints resulted in a lack of investment
in maintenance and infrastructure in company assets. They also dramatically reduced the company's contribution to
the national budget. 34 The Mexican economy was heavily dependent upon its energy industry, e.g., Pemex's revenue
totaled approximately one third of the entire budget of the Mexican government throughout its history as a national
monopoly. 35
These conditions created the political space for the dramatic reform that resulted in the energy bill signed by President
Enrique Peña Nieto in 2013 that completely reformed Mexico's energy industry by amending many articles of the
Mexican Constitution. 36 This reform, among other important features, allows for private investment in the downstream,
midstream, and upstream sectors and ends Pemex's monopoly of the oil and gas industry. 37
II. THE REFORM
A. An Overview
The sweeping changes made to the legal regime governing Mexico's energy industry are an amalgam of, among others, the
new Hydrocarbons Law, amendments to Articles 25, 27, and 28 of the venerable Mexican Constitution of 1917, 38 and
to existing regulations. 39 These changes opened *155 the Mexican energy industry to private foreign investment. 40
This dramatic transformation is one for which foreign investors had long hoped.
Reform of laws governing the exploration and production of hydrocarbons has generated the most interest from
investors. 41 The new law mandates that E&P contracts be awarded through a competitive, transparent bidding process,
in which Pemex must compete with participating private companies. 42 However, even if Pemex wins the auction, or if it is
given a right to explore or produce through an asignacione, an entitlement to these oil fields that is a part of the holdover
from the previous law, other entities may still have an opportunity to be involved in the activity. 43 Pursuant to the
new law, regulatory agencies have discretion to select from several contractual arrangements with varying risk profiles,
including license agreements, production sharing agreements, profit sharing agreements, and service contracts. 44
The new law converts both Pemex and the Federal Electricity Commission to “State Productive Companies,” the purpose
for which is generating profits and creating value for their owner, the Mexican government. 45 Although State-owned,
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these entities are designed to operate as independent businesses, autonomous in terms of the management and budget
decisions made by their respective boards of directors. 46
The reform did not tamper with one fundamental aspect of Mexico's “Pemex Pride:” Article 27 of the Constitution
preserves the sovereign's unequivocal ownership of all subsoil hydrocarbons. 47 While some have *156 argued that this
might present accounting complications for foreign investors attempting to present accurate reserve figures, 48 Article
27's clear focus on “subsoil” hydrocarbons, a distinction that did not appear prior to the 2014 amendment, may provide
the government with avenues for legal transfers or assignments after extraction. 49
B. Further Changes on the Horizon for Mexico's Energy Industry
As mentioned above, Pemex's deteriorating financial condition was one of the primary causes of the sweeping reform
in Mexico's energy industry. 50 Although it has improved since the reform took effect, the company is still confronting
financial challenges. 51 From 2015 to 2016, Pemex had nearly an eight percent reduction in total assets and a total
net income loss of over $9 billion in the fourth quarter of 2015 alone. 52 Pemex reduced its number of employees by
approximately ten percent due to budget cuts of roughly $5.7 billion, and it is likely that Pemex will continue to lay
off employees. 53 This poor financial situation could lead to further industry restructuring, including strategic changes
regarding Pemex's use and investment of assets and an overhaul of its tax treatment. 54
*157 The company's financial condition has impacted its operational strategy. 55 As its financial situation has
weakened, Pemex appears to have abandoned plans to develop promising oil fields to which it had exclusive development
rights. 56 Rather than moving forward with new development, Pemex's strategy appears to be identifying, focusing on,
and improving its most profitable operating assets, eschewing high risk/longer time horizon fields with great potential. 57
While its focus on efficiency reduced Pemex's net losses by nearly sixty percent in 2016, this strategy may decrease the
company's overall revenues, particularly longer term. 58
Many industry experts have considered how the company might improve its financial outlook. 59 One idea addresses the
negative impact of the Law of Hydrocarbon Revenues on Pemex's allowable tax deductions. 60 For example, in the first
quarter of 2015, expenses reached over 200% of returns on operation because, under current law, Pemex is prohibited
from fully deducting actual expenses. 61 That deduction is calculated based upon a percentage of the crude oil price, a
factor that does not always fluctuate in the same manner as operation costs. 62 Thus, Pemex is unable to deduct expenses
in the same way as can a private competing company. 63 One of the solutions currently proffered is for the Mexican
government to amend the Law of Hydrocarbon Revenues to level the playing field by allowing for Pemex to deduct
closer to the amount of its actual operating costs and expenses. 64 This seems to be a simple, yet effective, way to solve
this problem and to improve Pemex's bottom line. 65
This tax issue and the proposed solution present an interesting dilemma for private industry. 66 On one hand, Pemex's
current financial difficulties are creating opportunities for its competitors. 67 The State company's withdrawal from
several potentially lucrative development opportunities opens these prospects to private investors. 68 Conversely, a *158
financially unstable Pemex that consistently loses billions of dollars per year is not a particularly attractive business or
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joint venture partner. 69 Investors seek reliable partners, those willing and able to cover their share of costs and safely
assume risk when investing in high risk/high reward E&P projects but with longer-term production horizons. 70 That
same dilemma is likely present regarding any number of potential reform issues that may affect Pemex. 71
III. DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER THE HYDROCARBONS ACT
A. Article 21
The specters of Mexico's 1938 expropriations and of the more recent nationalizations in the region are ever-present
for foreign investors seeking entry to Mexico's energy sector. The 2013-2014 reforms attempt to alleviate concerns
regarding similar “capricious government action.” 72 Article 21 of the Hydrocarbons Act specifically authorizes parties
to E&P contracts to agree to utilize arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms as provided
in the Mexican Commercial Code, which incorporates the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, and the relevant international treaties to which Mexico is a party, such as the Inter-American Convention
on International Commercial Arbitration. 73 Should E&P contracting parties choose arbitration, Article 21 imposes
three explicit conditions upon arbitral proceedings and agreements: (1) Mexican federal laws must be the applicable law;
(2) the arbitration must be conducted in Spanish; and (3) the award shall be based upon applicable law and shall be final
and binding for both parties. 74
*159 Article 21's most significant limitation, however, is its exclusion of disputes regarding unilateral administrative
rescission by Mexican regulators from any form of alternative dispute resolution, reserving to the federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over those disputes. 75 Pursuant to Article 20 of the Hydrocarbons Law, the Mexican Executive Branch,
through its Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos, or National Hydrocarbons Commission (CNH), may unilaterally
rescind an E&P contract under the following enumerated circumstances: (1) the contractor does not commence, or
suspends, the planned E&P activities without due cause or approval from the CNH for a continuous period of more
than 180 days; (2) the contractor fails to comply with the minimum work commitment; (3) the contractor assigns, totally
or partially, the operation or the rights conferred in the E&P agreement without the prior approval of the CNH; (4) the
contractor's willful misconduct or negligence causes a serious accident which damages infrastructure or causes a fatality
or loss of production; (5) the contractor, willfully or without cause, provides false or incomplete information or fails to
disclose to the relevant authorities information regarding production, costs, or any other relevant aspect of the contract;
(6) the contractor fails to comply with a final resolution of any federal jurisdictional entity having res judicata effect;
or (7) the contractor fails, without cause, to make any payment or delivery of hydrocarbons to the Mexican State in
accordance with the time periods and terms established in the contract. 76
Although arbitration and other forms of dispute resolution are explicitly allowed and encouraged by Article 21 of the
Hydrocarbons Act, any and all disputes that relate to the government's unilateral administrative rescission are explicitly
excepted from being submitted to these processes. 77 The Executive prerogative to unilaterally rescind the contract
combined with the contractor's inability to submit such issues to arbitration is likely concerning for many potential
investors, particularly those from jurisdictions with a *160 common law tradition. 78 Article 20 appears to seek to
somewhat temper the discretion granted to the Executive Branch by limiting the scope of these rather broadly-worded
rescission triggers to “las causas graves,” or serious causes. 79 When one considers several of the “serious causes”
specifically set forth in Article 20, such as failing to make a payment with no peso or dollar floor below which the
rescission would not be appropriate, the limiting phrase itself is quite ambiguous, if not entirely meaningless. 80
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B. Dispute Resolution in the Model E&P Contracts
The language of Articles 20 and 21 left many questions unresolved for investors as to the Mexican government's
vision regarding dispute resolution under the Hydrocarbons Law. Analysis of the Model Contracts published as part
of Mexico's inaugural post-reform, deep-water tender open to private sector investors provides some insight. 81 This
“Ronda,” or round, of bidding involved exploration and production in ten deep water oil fields in the Gulf of Mexico
with a total reserve potential of up to eleven billion barrels, including the tender to participate with Pemex in the deep
water ‘Trion’ field. 82
While, as discussed in Part II, the reform approved four contract structures for E&P agreements, i.e., license, production
sharing, profit sharing or service, the form utilized in this bidding round was a license. 83 The relevant provisions of the
Model Contracts appear in Articles 23 and 26. 84 Article 23 sets forth the conditions both for administrative rescission
in Article 23.1 and for a separate right of termination for breach in Article *161 23.4. 85 While the circumstances
warranting rescission enumerated in Article 23.1 generally mirror those in the Hydrocarbons Law, 86 Article 23.1
contains several additional definitions that appear to be attempts to provide more clarity regarding “rescissive”
circumstances, perhaps to reassure private international entities expressing hesitation about investing under such insecure
legal conditions. 87
While an exhaustive analysis of these provisions of the Model Contracts exceeds the scope of this article, a brief
summary of several of Article 23.1's more interesting supplementary definitions is relevant. For example, Article 23.1(d)'s
“Accidente Grave,” or Serious Accident, is further defined as requiring three listed conditions in the conjunctive, i.e,
damage to the facilities, loss of life, or loss of production,. 88 Other clarifications pertain to the legal terms of art “Sin
Causa Justificada,” 89 or without just *162 cause; “Culpa,” 90 or fault; and “Dolo o de Forma Dolosa,” 91 or willful
misconduct, none of which provide the level of certainty that likely would assuage investor concerns about legal risks
associated with administrative rescission.
In addition to these definitional clarifications, CNH created a procedural framework that may provide reassurance to
investors that the Commission will not invoke the rescission clause imprudently. Article 23.2 provides for a mandatory
investigation period of not less than thirty days and not more than two years. 92 During this time, the contractor shall
guarantee the continuity of the E&P activities so long as they are safe and technically viable. 93
Should CNH determine that just cause for rescission exists, Article 23.3 establishes the administrative process. 94 Briefly,
CNH is required to provide written notice to the contractor of the cause or causes invoked, after which the contractor
has thirty days to respond. 95 Within the next ninety days, CNH must evaluate the contractor's arguments and evidence
and seek approval within its formal governance structure before rescission. 96 Most relevantly to this analysis, Article
23.3 mandates that all disputes regarding administrative rescission shall be resolved exclusively by the federal courts of
Mexico, as provided in the Model Contracts' Article 26.4. 97
With the exception of this federal court carve-out for administrative rescission, Article 26 is the primary “Applicable
Law and Dispute Resolution” provision of the Model Contracts. 98 Article 26.1 selects the *163 laws of Mexico as
the governing law. 99 Articles 26.2 and 26.3 describe a mandatory conciliation procedure that must be undertaken in
accordance with UNCITRAL's Conciliation Rules prior to the commencement of arbitration. 100
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Arbitration with a three-member panel is specified as the post-conciliation process for dispute resolution, again, with
the exception of disputes pertaining to administrative rescission. 101 Article 26.5 selects the Secretary General of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague as the nominating arbitral authority, The Hague as the seat, and the
Permanent Court of Arbitration of The Hague as the arbitral administrator. 102 The arbitration shall be conducted in
Spanish, its substance governed by Mexican law, and its resolution in strict accord with the law. 103 Pursuant to Article
26.7, contractors may not suspend E&P activities during the pendency of a dispute, unless the parties agree otherwise
or unless the CNH rescinds the relevant contract. 104 Further, the Model Contracts explicitly reference and confirm
the applicability of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and state that all
awards shall be final and binding. 105
C. The Consequences of Administrative Rescission
Administrative rescission results in serious legal and financial consequences for contractors. 106 While still liable for
compliance with numerous onerous contractual obligations, the Model Contracts demand that the contractor pay
contractually calculated liquidated damages; cease all non-essential E&P activities; and transfer of ownership to Mexico
without compensation of all machinery, tools, equipment, goods, supplies, infrastructure, etc. acquired, provided, leased,
or otherwise held for use for the E&P activities without compensation. 107 The Model Contracts do *164 provide for
the possibility of a settlement, but the language is far from encouraging, 108 and the contractor likely will have little
leverage at that point with which to question any government data or calculations.
As one observer noted, the Model Contracts' administrative rescission provisions demand that an investing party
essentially agree to expropriation by contract. 109 Given the Mexican government's history of expropriation, investors
would be unwise to ignore this threat, despite its obvious commitment to the reform and the economic realities driving
the reform.
D. A Cautionary Tale of Two Clauses: Commisa v. Pemex and the Possibility of Parallel Proceeding
Mexico attempted to clearly differentiate the allocation of responsibility between the federal courts and arbitral tribunals
in the new Hydrocarbons Law and the Model E&P Contracts published pursuant thereto. However, while the federal
courts retain exclusive jurisdiction for disputes relating to or in connection with administrative rescissions 110 and arbitral
tribunals are authorized to process any other claims, 111 one can envision several circumstances under which parallel
proceedings might arise.
The Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De C.V. v. Pemex Exploración Y Producción
(Commisa v. Pemex) case 112 demonstrates the hazards inherent in the dichotomous approach that the Mexican
government has taken by carving out an exemption for administrative rescission from Article 21's dispute resolution
structure in the Hydrocarbon Law. 113 Although this legal saga began in pre-reform era 2004 and dragged on for over
thirteen years, the underlying facts in the saga are not particularly unusual. 114 Yet, this cautionary tale illustrates the
legal complications that can arise when parties engage both the administrative rescission and arbitration provisions of a
contract simultaneously, or in parallel, with regard to a single matter, or related matters. 115
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*165 Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De C.V., more commonly referred to as Commisa,
a subsidiary of KBR, Inc., is a large engineering and construction company. In 1997, it contracted to build two offshore
gas platforms for Pemex's E&P subsidiary, Pemex Exploración Y Producción, in the Gulf of Mexico. 116 The contract
between these two parties contained a Mexican choice of law clause as well as dispute resolution provision specifying
arbitration in Mexico. 117 Similar to the post-2013-2014 reform Model E&P Contracts, the Commisa-Pemex contract
authorized Pemex to unilaterally rescind the contract administratively in the event of breach by Commisa or upon its
failure to perform. 118
When the working relationship between the parties began to deteriorate, Pemex invoked the rescission clause, alleging
that Commisa had not met its contractual deadlines and that it had abandoned its work on the two offshore gas
platforms. 119 Commisa sought arbitration while simultaneously disputing the constitutionality of Pemex's rescission in
the Mexican courts. 120
Commisa brought two proceedings, which resulted in different outcomes. 121 In 2009, the arbitral tribunal found in favor
of Commisa on its breach of contract claim and entered an award for over $300 million in damages. 122 Its constitutional
claims were not, however, successful in the Mexican courts. At the lower court level, the rescission was found to be both
constitutional 123 and within the bounds of the contract. 124 In 2011, on appeal to the Mexican equivalent of the U.S.
Court of Appeals, the court held that Commisa's $300 million arbitration award was against public policy, concluding
that Mexican administrative law did not permit the arbitration of claims against a government agency and, accordingly,
annulling the arbitral award. 125
Commisa v. Pemex arrived in the U.S. courts in 2010 when Commisa attempted to enforce its arbitral award. 126 A
U.S. federal district court determined that the arbitral award should be enforced as the Mexican court *166 ruling
that annulled the arbitration award offended core principals of justice. 127 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision in 2016, 128 and Pemex requested that the U.S. Supreme Court take this case. 129
Instead, the parties reached a settlement of the matter in 2017, prior to any substantive action on the part of the Supreme
Court. 130
The willingness of these U.S. courts to affirm an award that the host country had annulled caused alarm throughout
the international investment community, and there was significant interest in the ultimate response of the U.S. Supreme
Court to objections raised in Commisa v. Pemex. 131 Most consider the ability to execute an arbitral award in any country
in which the losing party has assets to be the most attractive feature of international arbitration. 132 Both the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention) 133
and the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1975 (the Panama Convention) 134
authorize courts in member States to enforce arbitral awards rendered in foreign States. 135 Each of these conventions
provides limited circumstances under which a court may *167 refuse to enforce an otherwise eligible arbitral award, 136
one of which is a “set aside” pertaining to awards that have been annulled or otherwise set aside by a competent authority
in the issuing country. 137
At least one other court has taken this approach when considering whether to enforce a foreign arbitral award that had
been annulled by a court in the primary jurisdiction. In Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 138 one of
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the first cases in the United States to raise this issue, the District Court for the District of Columbia enforced an arbitral
award issued in Egypt, despite its annulment in Egyptian courts, stating that to do otherwise would “violate ... clear
U.S. public policy[.]” 139
While the courts in these two cases did not do so, other U.S. courts have exercised their set aside discretion with regard
to vacated foreign arbitral awards. 140 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is one such court, ruling in the
2007 TermoRio v. Electranta case that an award set aside or annulled in the arbitral seat is no longer enforceable in the
United States. In this case, the D.C. Circuit held that “secondary States (in determining whether to enforce an award)
routinely second-guess the judgment of a court in a primary State, when the court in the primary State has lawfully
acted pursuant to ‘competent authority’ to ‘set aside”’ a domestic arbitration award. 141 A power purchase contract
was at issue in the TermoRio case. The agreement obligated Electranta, an entity owned primarily by the Colombian
government, to purchase power from TermoRio, which was owned by a U.S. corporation. 142 Although the contract
stipulated that all disputes should be settled in arbitration, a jurisdictionally-appropriate court in Colombia, the Consejo
de Estado, vacated a $60.3 million arbitral award granted to TermoRio in the U.S., reasoning that the Colombian
law in effect as of the date of the Agreement *168 did not expressly permit the use of the procedural rules that were
applied in arbitration. 143 Here, the D.C. Circuit refused to interfere with a “peculiarly Colombian affair” concerning
as it does “a dispute involving Colombian parties over a contract to perform services in Colombia which led to a
Colombian arbitration decision and Colombian litigation.” 144 The court noted that the discretion to refuse enforcement
“is narrowly confined” to circumstances in which the foreign judgment is “repugnant to fundamental notions of what is
decent and just in the State where enforcement is sought” or when it violates “basic notions of justice.” 145 Accordingly,
as the case facts were not “clear cut [,]” they did not meet that “high and infrequently met” standard for setting aside
a foreign judgment. 146
A similar result was reached in the Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co. v. Government of Lao People's Democratic Republic,
a case decided in the same federal district as was the Commisa case. 147 The dispute in Thai-Lao Lignite pertained to a
mining concession agreement between the Government of Laos and two private companies in which the parties agreed
to submit disputes to arbitration in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 148 A Malaysian arbitral tribunal originally issued a $57
million dollar arbitral award in favor of the companies for claims of improper termination. 149 The companies' petition
to confirm the award was granted by the district court; the Second Circuit affirmed, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 150
Shortly thereafter, however, the Malaysian courts vacated the arbitration award, concluding that the arbitrators had
exceeded their jurisdiction. 151 *169 Victorious at home, the Government of Laos returned to the U.S. to seek
relief from the district court's earlier judgment granting enforcement. 152 This time, due to a lack of “extraordinary
circumstances,” 153 the court determined that the judgments of the Malaysian courts “did not violate basic notions of
justice” and reversed its earlier judgment enforcing the arbitral award. 154
While the results in this case and in the Commisa case may appear contradictory, a focus on the “extraordinary
circumstances” 155 present, or absent, in their facts may offer a unifying theme 156 to explain such seemingly divergent
results. In Commisa, for example, the Mexican courts' judgments retroactively applied a prohibition on arbitrability in
favor of a State-owned entity, leaving Commisa without other legal avenues in which to pursue relief. 157 Conversely, in
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Thai-Lao Lignite, the award had been set aside in the courts of a neutral, third country mutually selected by the parties
on the universally-recognized ground, and it did not leave the unsuccessful parties without a remedy. 158
This complicated and divisive issue is being disputed in courts internationally, 159 and observers were eagerly awaiting
a definitive ruling *170 from the U.S. Supreme Court in the Commisa v. Pemex case. While a Supreme Court ruling
might have provided some clarity and perhaps a more certain standard for courts pondering foreign court annulments
of arbitral awards, 160 the settlement of the case requires a longer wait for more clarity on the issue. 161
Speculatively, however, it is conceivable that a Supreme Court ruling in favor of Commisa, confirming the arbitration
award, might mitigate the rescission risk in Mexico's energy regime, at least for investors with jurisdictional ties to the
United States. While Mexican energy industry regulations explicitly provide that governmental administrative rescissions
are non-arbitrable, 162 some of the more ambiguous terms in the Hydrocarbons law and the Model E&P Contracts
might offer investors the opportunity to begin parallel arbitration proceedings. 163 If successful in that forum, investors
could then seek enforcement of the awards in their home jurisdictions, particularly if Mexican authorities intervened in
the arbitral process in such a way as to qualify as “extraordinary circumstances,” 164 justifying the exercise of a court's
discretion to enforce arbitral awards. 165
Conversely, had the Supreme Court chosen not to enforce the arbitral award, administrative rescission likely would
assume an even higher risk *171 profile for foreign investors. It is unclear whether this risk would significantly impact
the number of investors and the amount of money those investors would be willing to commit to Mexico's energy
industry. However, a “non-enforcement” ruling from the Supreme Court would likely have caused some hesitation from
investors. 166 It is possible that a holding from the Supreme Court in which the justices had elected not to enforce the
arbitration award would ultimately have hurt the Mexican government in its quest to revitalize the energy industry. 167
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE RESCISSION: RISK MITIGATION
Given the implicit tension between Articles 20 and 21 of the Hydrocarbon Law and the strong potential for disagreement
regarding any contractual ambiguity, foreign investors must seek mechanisms to counter this particular risk. There are
several options that may mitigate, if not entirely eliminate, this legal vulnerability, a few of which are considered briefly
in the following text.
A. Extra-Contractual Options
1. NAFTA and Other International Investment Agreements
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and other international investment agreements (IIAs), including
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and multilateral investment agreements (MIAs), establish reciprocal substantive and
procedural protections for foreign investors, including safeguards against expropriation of an investment by the host
State and dispute settlement mechanisms outside a host State's legal system. 168 Clause 26.9 of the Model E&P Contracts,
with the heading International Treaties, clearly establishes that, as translated, “[t]he Contractor is entitled to the rights
recognized by the International Treaties subscribed by the State.” 169 Some commentators believe that this explicit
reference to, and *172 the investor protections of, these instruments may offer investors options for mitigating the risk
of administrative rescission. 170
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Now, to the caveats, one of which is the potential conflict between the 2013-2014 Mexican energy reform that relaxed
the country's restrictions on foreign investment in its energy industry and Mexico's exclusion of that industry from
NAFTA. 171 NAFTA's Chapter Six, titled Energy and Basic Petrochemicals, confirms “full respect” for the parties'
Constitutions 172 and explicitly reserves for Mexico the entire spectrum of energy exploration, production, processing,
transportation, storage, and supply chain, “including investment in such activities and the provision of services”
therein. 173 This reservation includes all energy sectors, i.e., crude oil and natural gas; artificial gas' basic petrochemicals
and their feedstocks; basic petrochemicals; electricity supply, with some exceptions; and various aspects of nuclear
power. 174 This industry exclusion also appears in NAFTA's Annex III, which prohibits private investment in, inter alia,
the hydrocarbon industry and provides that any such investment “shall not be construed to affect the State's reservation
of those activities.” 175
The impact of the 2013-2014 energy industry reforms on NAFTA are subject to some debate. Some argue that the
reform's constitutional changes would be sufficient to integrate the new energy regime without amendment, and others
contend that its reservations must be modified. 176 There remains much uncertainty as to whether NAFTA's terms were
drafted so as to integrate, without amendment, future legal developments within the party State. Unless these States
have an appetite for a highly politicized NAFTA amendment process 177 and can negotiate mutually- *173 satisfactory
terms, this uncertainty likely will remain until tested in the courts or an arbitral forum. 178
Putting those reservations aside, non-NAFTA investors with jurisdictional claims to countries with which Mexico has
executed an IIA 179 containing typical dispute resolution provisions may have cause for optimism. IIAs often specify
that investor-State disputes shall be arbitrated under the umbrella of the International Center for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID), 180 and, while Mexico is not a member of ICSID, 181 it has established treaties pertaining
to direct foreign investment with numerous countries, including, at last count, twenty-nine BITs. 182 Some of these
treaties allow for arbitration pursuant to ICSID Additional Facility Rules 183 or UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 184
These arbitral administrators offer both neutral decision-makers and a neutral regime relatively unencumbered by party
ties and, hopefully, influences. The majority of IIAs, including a number of Mexican IIAs, specify: the provisions of
the *174 agreement itself and general principles of international law as the applicable law; 185 they often are crafted in
multiple languages, each text being equally authentic; and they generally do not appear to impose unbalanced, onerous
arbitral language requirements upon investors. 186 Their scope of covered investments is generally broad, 187 but one
might find potentially troublesome exclusions in Mexican IIAs, including language exempting resolutions that prohibit
or restrict investment by its counterpart's investors from the dispute settlement provisions. 188
Investor-State disputes resulting in investment arbitration generally are not contractual disputes, unless the contract's
arbitration clause names the ICSID as the arbitral administrator. Several courts have held, however, that prejudicial
State interference with arbitration may violate either investment or other treaties. 189 For example, the European Court
of Human Rights decided a number of cases that involved the issue of execution of national and international arbitral
awards, most of which alleged violations of the “fair trial” provisions in the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). 190 In these cases, the Court *175 consistently has ruled that a commercial
arbitration award is property under Protocol 1 of Article 1 of the ECHR and that, without valid reasons, a failure to
enforce such an award violates that Convention's Article 6. 191
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Additionally, at least one arbitral tribunal, considering claims relating to the State interference with arbitration, has
concluded that a party's arbitral award “crystallized” the investment at issue in the dispute. 192 The next logical argument
is that the award itself may constitute jurisdictional investment. An award pursuant to an arbitral proceeding might
endow the prevailing E&P investor with standing to pursue an independent claim against Mexico in an IIA, or perhaps
even pursuant to NAFTA.
There is the caveat that any arbitration provisions in Mexican IIAs are subject to the same concerns attendant to the
tension between the administrative rescission remedy and the dispute resolution structure prescribed in the Hydrocarbon
Law and the corresponding provisions in the Model E&P Contract. 193 However, those IIAs with robust arbitration
clauses and with no NAFTA-like industry or other investment exclusions might prove helpful for foreign investors
participating in Mexico's energy sector. 194
2. Political Risk Insurance
Given that E&P operations generally require significant fixed investments, firms in that sector are often subject
to governmental actions and socio-environmental conditions that threaten their investments. Terrorism, widespread
criminal activity, general lawlessness, or popular uprisings and insurrection are all, of course, political risks to investors;
these risks often manifest in the form of responses by host, or, even their home, 195 *176 governments to increasing
resource nationalism, national security concerns, or other post-contractual events. 196 Such responses by the foreign
government may include the direct or indirect expropriation of assets; 197 the amendment, abrogation, or termination of
contracts; currency manipulations, transfer restrictions, or availability; or the breach of, or improper interference with,
contracts. 198
To manage these particular risks, investors should consider purchasing political risk insurance (PRI) or some form of
international or governmental export credit guarantee or funding that achieves the same purpose. The Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), export credit agencies, other
governmental agencies, and private insurers such as Lloyds of London and Chubb all offer insurance products for specific
political risks, including Expropriation, Nationalization, and Deprivation (CEND) risks; selective discrimination;
political violence; and terrorism. 199
OPIC is a frequent insurer in this market for U.S. investors. 200 It is part of the executive branch of the U.S. government
and was one of the very first PRI providers. 201 Its products are available to U.S. companies doing business in and/or
investing in particular emerging markets, including *177 Mexico. 202 It provides extensive coverage from expropriation,
impairment of contract, regulatory risk, tumult caused by political upheaval, and other improper foreign government
interference actions. 203 Additionally, OPIC offers arbitral award default and denial of justice coverage 204 that protects
U.S. companies as well as their debt and/or equity investors. 205 OPIC also provides enhanced coverage for petroleum
E&P in developing countries, including protection against interference with operations and expropriation, defined as
losses attributable to unilaterally-imposed material changes in project agreements by host governments and as asset
confiscation of tangible assets and bank accounts. 206
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MIGA, another popular PRI insurer, was established by an international convention as a member of the World Bank
Group. 207 This agency insures projects that promote foreign direct investment into developing countries in order to
enhance confidence among cross-border investors. 208
All PRI policies, however, have limitations. Eligibility requirements may exclude certain investors or countries, 209 and
coverage limits may be inadequate, 210 a grave concern when making E&P investments. There also may be gaps in specific
coverage areas. For example, some PRI will not compensate investors for some forms of expropriations, including those
arising from actions provoked by the investor, from lawful host State regulation or taxation, or from host State actions
taken in a commercial *178 capacity. 211 Relevant to hydrocarbon investors, “OPIC will not compensate for loss of
reserves of any kind.” 212 Currency inconvertibility coverage is another example where there may be PRI gaps; some
policies may not protect against host State currency devaluations as they are characterized as a “commercial” risk. 213
Limitations, however, are inherent in any risk management option. They should not deter foreign energy investors in
Mexico from seriously considering PRI as one mechanism for minimizing the risk of expensive and prolonged legal
proceedings caused in the event of an administrative rescission.
Investors have a number of other extra-contractual 214 risk management devices, many of which might be characterized
as common sense. It seems obvious, but many potential disputes can be avoided by cultivating good working relationships
with international and host country partners; with government officials, administrators, and administrative staff at
all levels of government (and with their counterparts in opposition parties); with local community members; with
non-governmental organizations and other civil society groups; with the press; and with lenders and insurers. So too
can sharing technology and expertise generously, exceeding local content and labor requirements when possible; and
investing in local communities. 215 Conversely, most foreign investors seek to minimize physical assets in the host State
and to match or transfer as much risk as possible to third party contractors that are better able to manage particular
risks, such as material supply.
While it is impossible to eliminate all risks, investors can and do implement well-planned strategies for its mitigation.
In addition to these and other extra-contractual mechanisms, potential investors in the Mexican E&P sector can make
effective use of contract terms as a hedge against uncertain legal risks like administrative rescission.
B. Contractual Options
For those investing in Mexico's E&P sector, the government's Model Contracts will govern their activities. Such prepublished models often leave scarce opportunity for revisions or for the negotiation of new *179 terms. 216 In the event
that such an opportunity arises or that conditions change, however, common contract clauses may provide some measure
of protection against the legal risks inherent in the potentially conflicting Articles 20 and 21 of the Hydrocarbon Law
and their counterparts in the Model Contracts.
A joint enterprise with local and international partners is one contract structure that provides both contractual and extracontractual risk management. It does so by contractually spreading an investor's risk over a larger pool of stakeholders
as well as by extra-contractually deterring interventionist host State action. 217 The inclusion of local entity partners may
be an effective method of allocating to them project political risks, such as using dollar-denominated or indexed pricing,
local exchange rate and inflation risks, and force majeure clauses related to local conditions. Because governments often
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provide guaranties to their local entities, these risks ultimately are passed along to them. 218 There are some who contend
that local partners create more problems than they solve, 219 but strategic joint ventures that align a host government's
financial interests with an investment are often seen as a valuable deal structure, risk-management wise.
Holdback clauses are among the many post-closing price adjustment terms included in all manner of transactional
agreements that serve the purpose of performance bond to incentivize party compliance with contractual
commitments. 220 The release of the funds, held either by the payor or in escrow, generally coincides with the guarantee
period. 221 The contracting parties agree on the holdback process. While details vary in different contracts, one party
withholds a certain percentage of the total value of the contract from each payment until certain conditions are satisfied
or until project completion, contract expiration, or some other pre-determined time. 222 Upon completion, and subject
to failure of any *180 conditions, the withholding party releases any remaining funds. 223 The parties often agree that
the withholding party will pay interest on the money being withheld. 224
The conditions under which a party is authorized to release the funds, or conversely, pursue a claim against the holdback
funds, warrant particular attention and should be carefully crafted to avoid ambiguity and future misunderstandings.
Events that trigger the release of funds may include target production levels, the expiration of closing price adjustments
or representations and warranties, or milestone dates. 225 Parties seeking holdback funds often make claims pertaining
to alleged breaches of representations and warranties or covenants and to adverse litigation. 226
Creative, flexible mechanisms for revenue sharing between host governments and private investors are other contractual
options that may mitigate political risks such as administrative rescission. Limited only by the creativity of the negotiators
and the mutual appeal of the mechanism, these contract clauses align the economics of projects between investors and the
host government. They can take many forms, such as minimum, minimal royalties with possible longevity incentives and/
or baseline escalators in the event of an in increase in market prices above pre-determined levels. 227 Escalating royalty
structures based upon a combination of contract longevity and market prices are another variation, as are options that
establish inverse tax rates-to-market price formulae. 228
Structures such as these not only may insulate investors from the risk of rescission, they also provide a reliable and stable
source of income for host governments. 229 Because royalties are most often calculated as a percentage of gross revenues,
without reductions for depreciations or other tax deductions claimed by the investor, this maximizes income for both
*181 the host government and for the investor, with the added investor benefit of quicker recovery of sunk costs. 230
The calculation of royalties and other contract payments for Mexican E&P activities is set forth in Annex III of the
Model Contracts, styled Procedures to Determine Considerations. 231 Pursuant to Article 4.1 of Annex III, the amount
of the royalties will be determined for each type of hydrocarbon through the application of the rate corresponding
to contractually specified values, with a consideration of State participation in production and additional investments
commitments and subject to annual adjustment. 232 The success of alternative means of revenue allocation in Mexican
E&P projects is dependent on the government's willingness to consider extra-Model options. Properly structured,
however, alternative options provide incentives for host countries to avoid administrative rescissions.
There are other tools by which investors can align project economics so that both benefits and risks are shared with a
host State. For example, economic and/or legal stabilization clauses may alleviate concerns of foreign investors with the
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State's commitment to stabilize a contract's economic bargain 233 or the laws governing a project rules, either universally
or for individual projects. 234
A total government take (TGT) 235 term can be an effective economic stabilizer. This term can be used in an offset
clause, above which the investor would get a credit. The TGT would include all exactions from every level of government,
including all taxes, duties, and royalties over the life of the contract, and other total projected distributions. 236 Should
the government enact new legislation or regulations or apply existing laws in such a way that it raises government TGT
above the baseline, the increases would be offset against future payments to stabilize distributions.
Liquidated damage clauses provide another contractual mechanism for minimizing any economic uncertainty pertaining
to a legal risk such as *182 an administrative rescission. 237 These clauses pre-determine the damages due in certain
events of breach. 238 The calculations attempt to project what damages would accrue should the clause be activated. 239
Estimates such as these are notoriously difficult to predict, and, in order to avoid having the clause declared enforceable
by a reviewing court, drafters should take care that the sum is not grossly disproportionate to realistic projections of
actual damages. 240
The administrative rescission language of Article 23 in the Model E&P Contracts appears to exclude the possibility
of liquidated damages in favor of the investor. 241 To the contrary, investors are liable for contractually calculated
liquidated damages following a rescission. 242 While there is settlement language in the Models, its calculations are
strictly conscribed. 243
Foreign investors participating in the Mexican E&P sector could seek to utilize such a clause in their agreements,
should they have an opportunity to negotiate terms. 244 Similar to holdbacks, liquidated damages clauses can be useful
disincentives to contractual breaches. Ideally, if an investor were able to include a reciprocal liquidated damages clause,
one that takes into account the damage suffered following an unlawful administrative rescission, i.e., the value of seized
assets, lost revenue, etc., it certainly would partially mitigate the risks associated with that governmental act. 245
All of the contractual options briefly considered above are useful risk management tools for foreign investors in
uncertain markets. For those investing in Mexico's E&P sector, because their Mexican counterparts have little incentive
to negotiation additions or amendments to government's Model Contracts, contractual options may have limited value in
minimizing the legal risks inherent in the conflicting administrative rescission remedy and the dispute resolution structure
set forth in the Hydrocarbon Law and *183 the corresponding Model E&P Contracts. 246 Mexico has a good deal of
leverage as there has been intense interest, and, to date, gratifying participation in its E&P tenders.
CONCLUSION
Mexico's energy reform was designed to attract foreign investment to the industry, and it creates significant opportunities
for investors to capitalize on the vast reserves of Mexican natural resources. However, inherent risks inure to E&P, risks
related to the uncertain nature of the sector, but also to elements of the legislative and contractual architecture of the
reform itself.
Mexico's long history of producing and selling oil is troubled by the country's expropriation of foreign energy company
assets. The government-owned entity created in the wake of those expropriations, Pemex, which has controlled the oil
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segment of the country's energy industry, has been described as being of “quasi-religious significance to the Mexican
people.” 247 Indeed, labor unions and civic organizations have taken to the streets to protest Mexico's energy reforms. 248
Coupled with the recent wave of energy nationalizations in the region and elsewhere, 249 investors may have legitimate
concerns about making the type of substantial investment that is required and typical for hydrocarbon E&P.
Mexico's recent energy reform considerably decreases the amount of control that Pemex has within this industry,
yet expropriation and government interference remain concerns for foreign investors. Additionally, while the dispute
resolution provisions of the reform legislation were designed to reassure foreign investors, the administrative rescission
exemption therefrom certainly may undermine investor confidence in the government's commitments. The Commisa v.
Pemex case illustrates this risk quite dramatically.
Investors should carefully evaluate the administrative rescission exception as they calculate their risk tolerance for
Mexican energy projects. There are mechanisms, extra-contractual and contractual, available to foreign investors to
minimize potential risks. However, several of the world's largest oil companies have decided that the potential rewards
are worth the risk, with both individual firms and consortia placing bids in the *184 fourth round of the first tender,
Round 1.4, to conduct E&P in ten of Mexico's deep-water oil fields. 250 Among the companies participating either
individually or as part of a consortium were ExxonMobil, BP, Chevron, Shell, Murphy, Statoil, Total, Lukoil, and
China's CNOOC. 251 Pemex also offered a farm-out, or lease, of its E&P rights to the deep-water Trion block in Round
1.4, with Trion being one of the most promising of the Pemex assets. 252
The majority of observers deemed Round 1.4 a great success, with the Mexican authorities drawing praise for their
transparency and their willingness to improve the fiscal and contract terms for its oil and gas tenders in response to
market demands. 253 The improved terms obviously satisfied many market players: the total investment that may derive
from this Round is estimated at $40 billion. 254
The Pemex-BHP venture illustrates investor confidence in Mexico's commitment to reform. In its agreement with Pemex,
valued overall at U.S. $1.2 billion, BHP holds a sixty percent stake in the venture and agreed to drill one appraisal
well and one exploration well, to acquire additional seismic data, and to commit approximately $320 million to the
contractually-required three-year Minimum Work Program. 255 It also agreed to pay an additional royalty of 4% over
the base royalty rate of 7.5%, and, should the venture partners agree to move beyond the Minimum Work Program,
BHP must invest the remainder of the $570 million minimum contribution, inclusive of the expenditure on Minimum
Work. What won the bid for BHP was its upfront cash payment of $624 million, a figure that exceeded competitor BP's
$605.9 million equivalent.
Despite the improvements that Mexico made to its program terms, the administrative rescission and dispute resolution
provisions of the executed *185 contracts from Round 1.4 appear largely unchanged. 256 The Model Contracts'
administrative rescission exemption from arbitration, however unlikely its exercise, might result in protracted parallel
proceedings. 257
Perhaps, given Mexico's gratifying responsiveness to investor concerns, potential bidders might convince Mexican
authorities to address the risks associated with the rescission and dispute resolution provision of its contracting scheme.
If not, investors must consider the many options available to mitigate that risk to ensure a more predictable legal
environment for their new investments in Mexico's energy sector.
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Negroponte, Mexico's Energy Reforms, supra note 40. See also Diane Villiers Negroponte, Mexico's Secondary Law Provides a
Path Forward for New Investments in the Hydrocarbons Sector, BROOKINGS (June 25, 2014), https://perma.cc/PV3Q-9PYA.

43

See John B. McNeece & Michael S. Hindus, Mexico's Energy Reform Provides Significant Opportunities in Oil and Gas
Exploration and Production, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN (Aug. 28, 2014), https://perma.cc/KY9A-7LDA.

44

See generally Samples, supra note 3.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, Article 27, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF]
05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 10-02-2014, http://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/mex/en_mex-inttext-const.pdf (retaining,
then repeating, the existing constitutional assertion of State sovereignty over subsoil resources).

48

James L. Sweeney et al., North American Energy, in NAFTA AT 20: THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT'S ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES 99, 112-14 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 2014). These authors have
drawn a comparison to Canada's E&P structure, under which private companies are authorized to explore and produce
hydrocarbon reserves, but the Canadian provinces retain ownership of subsoil oil. Id.at 114.

49

Diana Villiers Negroponte, Mexican Energy Reform: Opportunities for Historic Change, BROOKINGS (Dec. 23, 2013),
https://perma.cc/9P8F-TV8Q.

50

See Mexico - Competition from State-Owned Enterprises, supra note 34.

51

See id.
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52

See Nacha Cattan, Adam Williams & Eric Martin, Mexico Gives Pemex Tax Break Worth $1.5 Billion, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Apr. 14, 2016, at 13C1, 13C4, https://perma.cc/2ZLB-RYV3; Mexico - Competition from State-Owned Enterprises, supra note
34.

53

See id.

54

See David Alire Garcia, Mexico to Keep Pumping Pemex for Tax Money Despite Promised Reforms, REUTERS (Oct. 30,
2013), https://perma.cc/5ACA-DBB2; Turanzas, Bravo & Ambrosi, Mexico: Energy Reform - Chapter III: PEMEX Tax
Regime, MONDAQ (June 30, 2015), https://perma.cc/J39M-G2AC; Mexico - Competition from State-Owned Enterprises,
supra note 34.

55

See Mexico - Competition from State-Owned Enterprises, supra note 34.

56

See id.

57

See id.

58

See id.

59

See id.

60

Id.

61

Id. But see Negroponte, Mexico's Energy Reforms, supra note 40.

62

Mexico - Competition from State-Owned Enterprises, supra note 34.

63

See id.

64

See id.

65

See id.

66

See id.

67

See id.

68

See id.

69

See Olavarría & Keays, supra note 39; la Parra, Llamas & Estandía, supra note 39.

70

See Mexico - Competition from State-Owned Enterprises, supra note 34.

71

See id.

72

Kyle Doherty, Comment, From “The Oil Is Ours!” to Liberalization: Resource Nationalism and the Mexican Energy Reform,
53 HOUS. L. REV. 245, 260 (2015).

73

Hidrocarburos [LH], Art. 21, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 11 de Agosto de 2014 (Mex.); Inter-American Convention
on International Commercial Arbitration, June 16, 1976, 1438 U.N.T.S. 245. See Alejandro Escobar, The Mexican Oil & Gas
Reforms: Arbitration and Dispute Resolution in the 2014 Mexican Hydrocarbons Act, 2 ROCKY MTN MIN. L. FOUND.
13C-1, 13C-12 (2015) (referring to Código de Comercio, Arts. 1415-1480).

74

Hidrocarburos [LH], Art. 21, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 11 de Agosto de 2014 (Mex.).

75

Id.
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76

Hidrocarburos
[LH],
Art.
20,
Diario
Oficial
de
la
Federación
[DOF],
11
de
Agosto
de
2014
(Mex.),
translated
in
THOMPSON
&
KNIGHT,
HYDROCARBONS
LAW
11-12,
https://www.tklaw.com/files/Publication/5f93e40d-fc4d-445c-b7f9-7dc1cc20b56e/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/9b630df7-5e9e-4e9c-a2f6-80af30e552ff/Mexico-Hydrocarbons-Law-English-Translation.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 24, 2017). See also Escobar, supra note 73, at 13C-7-9; Olavarría & Keays, supra note 39.

77

Hidrocarburos [LH], Art. 21, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 11 de Agosto de 2014 (Mex.); Escobar, supra note 73,
at 13C-7.

78

See id. Mexico's legal system, laws, and Constitution, however, were influenced by French and Spanish law, the traditions of
which customarily granted the Executive Branch the power to change the conditions of, or completely rescind a contract.

79

Hidrocarburos [LH], Art. 20, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 11 de Agosto de 2014 (Mex.).

80

Id.

81

Alejandro Aurrecoechea, Mexico's Deep-Water Oil Round: The Time Of Truth For Energy Reform?, FORBES (Dec. 1, 2016),
https://perma.cc/8K38-WF3N.

82

Id.

83

Contrato para la Exploración y Extracción de Hidrocarburos Bajo la Modalidad de Licencia (Aguas Profundas), COMISIÓN
NACIONAL DE HIDROCARBUROS (Model Contracts) (Aug. 31, 2016), http://rondasmexico.gob.mx/l04-ap-contratos/.
There were two Model Contracts: one for individual entities and another for consortia. Id. Because the provisions governing
dispute resolution and administrative rescission are identical in both Models, this article will not distinguish between the two
versions.

84

Id. at Arts. 23, 26.

85

Id. at Arts. 23.1, 23.4. The justifications for contractual termination are set forth in Article 23.4 of the Model Contracts.
Although there was substantially similar language in several of the grounds warranting Article 23.1's administrative rescission
and Article 23.4's contractual termination, such as Work Plan delays, the final published draft, dated August 31, 2016, appears
to have resolved much of this duplication, eliminating at least a significant source of potential ambiguity and conflict. See
Model Contracts, supra note 83.

86

See supra text accompanying note 8.

87

Fernando Cano-Lasa, Mexico Energy Reform: Dispute Resolution for Operations Facing Administrative Rescission of Their
Exploration and Production Agreements, 39 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 5, 25-26 (2017).

88

Art. 23.1(i), Model Contracts, supra note 83. “Damage to the Facilities” also is further defined as a situation “that prevents
the Contractor from carrying out the Petroleum Activities in the Contract Area during a period exceeding ninety (90) Days
as of the accident occurs[,]” as is “loss of production,” which “implies any uncontrolled destruction or leak of Hydrocarbons,
equal or higher than ten thousand (10,000) barrels of equivalent crude oil; different from the vented, flared and discharged
under standard operating conditions during the performance of the Petroleum Activities conducted under the Best Industry
Practices and the Applicable Laws. If the accident occurs during the Exploration Period, any Oil or Condensates spill or
Natural Gas leak shall be considered as Loss of Production.” Id. at art. 23.1(i)(1), (3). “Información o Reportes Falsos o
Incompletos,” or False or Incomplete Information or Reports, also has an expanded definition in Article 23.1(v), requiring
that they be “contrary to the truth or deliberatively insufficient in such a way that the minimum necessary elements ... cannot
be [ascertained] ... according to their nature and purpose, and presented with the deliberate intent to deceive the CNH or any
other Governmental Authority in order to obtain an undue benefit that would have come as a result of the submission of
truthful and/or complete information.” Id. at art. 23.1(v).
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89

Translated, “[a]ny cause attributable without any doubt to the Contractor ....” Id. at art. 23.1(ii).

90

To paraphrase the translation, any action or omission of the Contractor that causes a result that, even if not foreseen, was
foreseeable, or, if foreseen, was the result of the Contractor's confidence that it would not materialize and that was derived in
the violation of the Applicable Laws or a violation of a duty that was objectively required to be observed regarding industrial
safety. Id. at art. 23.1(iii).

91

Translated, “[a]ny action or omission of the Contractor or the Participating Companies with the intention of pursuing a result
directly.” Id. at art. 23.1(iv).

92

Id. at art. 23.2.

93

Id.

94

Id. at art. 23.3.

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

Id. Article 26.4 does authorize contractors to initiate arbitral proceedings pursuant to Article 26.5 of the Model Contracts, but
“only for the determination of the existence [and quantification] of damages that result” in a cause or causes of administrative
rescission determined by a federal court to be unfounded. Art. 26.4, Model Contracts, supra note 83.

98

Art. 26, Model Contracts, supra note 83.

99

Id. at art. 26.1.

100

Id. at art. 26.2, 26.3.

101

Id. at art. 26.5.

102

Id.

103

Id.

104

Id. at art. 26.7.

105

Id.

106

Art. 23.1, Model Contracts, supra note 83. Pursuant to Article 23.5 of the Models, these consequences also result in the event
of a contractual termination pursuant to Article 23.4. Id. at art. 23.5. The seriousness of these impacts is somewhat mitigated
by the fact that, unlike disputes concerning administrative rescission, contractual termination disputes are not excluded from
the dispute resolution provisions of the Models' Article 26. Id. at art. 26.

107

Art. 23.5, Model Contracts, supra note 83.

108

Id.

109

Brad Finney's quite astute statement in an initial draft of this article.

110

Art. 23.1, Model Contracts, supra note 83.

111

Id.
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112

Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De C.V. v. Pemex Exploración Y Producción, 832 F.3d 92,
97 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. dismissed, 137 S. Ct. 1622 (2017) [hereinafter Commisa v. Pemex].

113

Hidrocarburos [LH], Art. 21, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 11 de Agosto de 2014 (Mex.).

114

Commisa, 832 F.3d at 97.

115

Hidrocarburos [LH], Art. 21, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 11 de Agosto de 2014 (Mex.).

116

Commisa, 832 F.3d at 98. While the court refers to the Pemex entity as PEP, these authors have retained the Pemex
denomination. See id.

117

Id.

118

Id.

119

Id.

120

Id.

121

Id. at 97-99.

122

Id. at 99.

123

Id. at 98-100.

124

Id.

125

Id. at 99.

126

Id.

127

Corporacion Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. de R.L. de C.V. v. Pemex-Exploracion y Produccion, 962 F. Supp. 2d
642, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (history omitted). A discussion of the entire history of the case, including its first appearance at
the trial court and on appeal, is omitted to avoid a lengthy and unnecessary discussion. The opinion cited reflects the case
on remand. Id. at 652.

128

Commisa, 832 F.3d at 119-20.

129

See Caroline Simson, Battle Over KBR Unit's $300M Award Heads to Supreme Court, LAW 360 (Feb. 21, 2017), https://
perma.cc/94M4-NE6Y.

130

See KBR Resolves Decade Long Dispute in Mexico, OFFSHORE ENERGY TODAY (Apr. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/CP5FQFZ8.

131

See, e.g., Letter Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States of America, Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S.
De R.L. De C.V. v. Pemex Exploración Y Producción, 832 F.3d 92 (2016) (No. 13-4022).

132

See Nathan M. Crystal, The Duty of Competency in International Transactions: Part II, S.C. LAW., Nov. 2012, at 9, https://
perma.cc/7DXK-NMC2.

133

United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518,
330 U.N.T.S. 3 [New York Convention].

134

Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1975, Pub. L. No. 101-369, 104 Stat. 448 (1990)
[hereinafter Panama Convention].
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135

An arbitral award will only be recognized and enforced under the Panama Convention if the award was rendered in a State
that has acceded to the Convention. Id. at § 304. See also R. Doak Bishop & Elaine Martin, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 3, 9-10.

136

See Commisa, 832 F.3d at 105-06; Bishop & Martin, supra note 135, at 10-11.

137

See 832 F.3d at 105-07; Bishop & Martin, supra note 135, at 10-11. For example, Article V of the Panama Convention limits,
inter alia, the discretion of courts to refuse the recognition and execution of a foreign arbitral award to cases in which the
requesting party is able to prove that the award “has been [annulled] or suspended by a competent authority of the country
in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.” Art. V(1), Panama Convention, supra note 134.

138

Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996).

139

Id. at 913.

140

See e.g., TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v.
Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999).

141

487 F.3d 928.

142

Id. at 930-32.

143

Id.

144

Id. at 939 (quoting TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electrificadora Del Atlantico S.A. E.S.P., 421 F. Supp. 2d 87, 101, 103 (D.D.C.
2006) (citations omitted).

145

Id. at 938-39 (citations omitted).

146

Id. at 938 (citations omitted).

147

See Thai-Lao Lignite Co., Ltd. v. Gov't of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, 997 F. Supp. 2d 214, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2014),
appeal docketed, No. 14-597 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 2014).

148

Id.

149

Id. at 217.

150

Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co., Ltd. v. Gov't of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, No. 10 Civ. 5256, 2011 WL 3516154,
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2011), aff'd, 492 F. App'x 150 (2d. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, ––– U.S. –––, 133 S. Ct. 1473 (Feb. 21, 2013). The
award was also found to be enforceable in England by the English High Court of Justice, Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co. Ltd.
& Hongsa Lignite (Lao Pdr) Co., Ltd. v Government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, [2012] EWHC 3381 (Comm),
on October 26, 2012, but its enforcement was denied by the Paris Court of Appeal. See infra Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co.,
Ltd. v. Gov't of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, at *2 n.9.

151

Thai-Lao Lignite, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 217-18.

152

Id.

153

Id. at 227.

154

Id. at 230.

155

Id. at 227.
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156

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, in its amicus brief supporting Commisa in Pemex's petition for certiorari, proposed a multifactor balancing test to guide courts considering whether to exercise their discretion to enforce awards annulled by the courts
of the arbitral forum. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in Support
of Petitioner-Appellee and Affirmance, Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De C.V. v. Pemex
Exploración Y Producción, 832 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 2016) (No 1:10-cv-0206-AKH). This test presumes that all relevant treaty
requirements have been satisfied: (1) the award must have been annulled; (2) by a competent authority; and (3) of a State in
which, or under the law of which, the award was made, and it appears to explain the divergent results in the relevant cases. Id.
The proposed multi-factor balancing test includes a consideration of the following factors, if present: (1) the pro-enforcement
bias of the applicable convention; (2) level of scrutiny afforded to the award, or grounds required, for annulment; (3) the
characteristics of the annulment proceedings; (4) the likelihood that the annulment order would be entitled to recognition in
U.S. courts; and (5) any other circumstances that could tend to shift the balance in favor of or against enforcement. Id.

157

Corporacion Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 659.

158

See Thai-Lao Lignite, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 227-28.

159

This complicated and divisive issue is being disputed in tribunals and courts internationally. See, e.g., Yukos Capital s.a.r.l.
v. OAO Rosneft, 2009 (Amsterdam Court of Appeal), XXXIV Y. B. Comm. Arb. 703; PT Putrabali Adyamulia (Indonesia)
v. Rena Holding et al, 2007 (Cour de Cassation), XXXII Y. B. Comm. Arb. 299; Directorate General of Civil Aviation of
the Emirate of Dubai v. International Bechtel Co. Limited Liability Company (Panama), 2005 (Paris Cour d'appel), XXXI
Y. B. Comm. Arb. 629. See generally Julie Bédard, Lea Haber Kuck & Timothy G. Nelson, PEMEX and US Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitration Awards Nullified in their ‘Home’ Courts, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/Q45M-CWWJ.

160

See Caroline Simson, Eyes on High Court to Weigh in on Annulled Arbitral Awards, LAW 360 (Feb. 21, 2017), https://
perma.cc/6KMF-U4UT.

161

See KBR Resolves Decade Long Dispute in Mexico, supra note 130.

162

Hidrocarburos [LH], Art. 21, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 11 de Agosto de 2014 (Mex.).

163

See id.

164

See Commisa, 832 F.3d at 100, 111. It is likely, however, that the ruling in Commisa does not actually apply to investors
in Mexico's energy industry given the current Model Contracts and stipulations. See id. at 111-112; Escobar, supra note
73, at 13C-3-10; Barry Fitzgerald, BHP Billiton Breaks Mexican Oil Barrier in Pemex Deal, AUS. NEWSP., Dec. 7, 2016,
https://perma.cc/B6X6-WPWV. Under the current energy reform, the private party clearly is agreeing to not submit any issues
regarding the rescission of the contract to arbitration; thus, this might not violate the notions of justice as the parties are
explicitly agreeing to not arbitrate these issues. See Escobar, supra note 73, at 13C-7. And, it could be argued that the ruling
in Commisa is inapplicable to current energy agreements because unlike current energy agreements, Pemex and Commisa did
not agree to not submit any contract rescission issues to arbitration. See 832 F.3d at 102-110.

165

Cf. Thai-Lao Lignite, 997 F. Supp. 2d 214.

166

See Commisa, 832 F.3d at 111.

167

See Lopez-Velarde & Vasquez, supra note 10, at 155-57.

168

North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. See
generally North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., https://perma.cc/
FJZ3-87KC (last visited Oct. 25, 2017); Bilateral Investment Treaties, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., https://
perma.cc/2A76-38EM (last visited Oct. 25, 2017).

169

Model Contracts, supra note 83.
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170

See, e.g., Rob Nikolewski, Energy Looks to be Spared in any NAFTA Reset, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 20, 2017,
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/sd-fi-nafta-energy-20170526-story.html.

171

Compare Hidrocarburos [LH], Art. 21, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 11 de Agosto de 2014 (Mex.), with NAFTA,
supra note 168, at art. 608 & Annex 602.3.

172

Art. 601(1), NAFTA, supra note 168.

173

Id. at art. 602.3(1).

174

Id.

175

Annex III, NAFTA, supra note 168.

176

See Rosío Vargas, Energy Reform: 20 Years After
LATINOAMERICANA DE ECONOMÍA (Apr.-June 2017).

177

See, e.g., Antonio Martinez, What a Changing NAFTA Could Mean for Doing Business in Mexico, HARV. BUS. J. (June 20,
2017), https://perma.cc/AL3X-B7L5. Consider, however, the notice of arbitration that KBR, the parent company of Commisa,
filed against Mexico in 2013 alleging breaches of different provisions of Chapter XI of NAFTA as well as Article 1503(2).
While this filing warrants its own analysis, which cannot be conducted in this article, it is interesting to note that Mexico did
not make any claim of arbitrability ratione materiae with regard to its Chapter 6 and Annex III reservation of all activities
related to the hydrocarbons and electricity industries, including the exclusion of disputes arising therefrom from NAFTA's
Chapter 11 dispute resolution procedures and notwithstanding private contracts. Gabriel Cavazos Villanueva, Arbitration and
Investment Protection within the Context of the Energy Reform in Mexico: A First Approach Based on COMMISA v. PEMEX
and KBR v. Mexico, in ESTADO DE DERECHO Y REFORMA ENERGETICA EN MÉXICO (Baker Inst. for Pub. Pol'y,
2017) (discussing KBR's NAFTA filing in connection with Commisa v. Pemex).

178

But see Villanueva, supra note 177.

179

Although it can prove to be a controversial strategy, multinationals often structure their transactional entities to take
advantage of BIT protections. See generally Julien Chaisse, The Treaty Shopping Practice: Corporate Structuring and
Restructuring to Gain Access to Investment Treaties and Arbitration, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 225 (2015).

180

See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17
U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].

181

Database of ICSID Member States, INTL. CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISP., https://icsid.worldbank.org//about/
Database-Member-States.aspx.

182

See Investment Climate Statements for 2016 - Mexico, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, https://perma.cc/V89Y-U35Y (last visited Oct.
26, 2017); Additional Facility Rules, ICSID Convention (Apr. 2006), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/
AFR_English-final.pdf.

183

See, e.g., Commonwealth of Australia - Mexico Bilateral Investment Treaty, Austl.-Mex. art. 13(4), Aug. 23, 2005, 2483
U.N.T.S. 247 (entered into force July 21, 2007).

184

Commission on International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 19.3 (Dec. 15, 1976) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules].

185

NAFTA signatories, however, are entitled to protections from the treaty regardless of the limitations of international law.
See generally Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Gov't of Can., 41 I.L.M. 1347, 1357 (2002).

186

ICSID utilizes three official languages: French, Spanish, or English. Reg. 34(1), Regulations and Rules, ICSID Convention
(Apr. 2006), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/2006%20CRR_English-final.pdf. Cf. Susan D. Franck,

NAFTA,

48

PROBLEMAS
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Empiricism and International Law: Insights for Investment Treaty Dispute Resolution, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 767, 804-05 (2008)
(“[P]reliminary empirical work on investment treaty dispute resolution demonstrates that the vast majority of awards are in
English.”).

187

See e.g., Mahnaz Malik, Bull. #1, Definition of Investment in International Investment Agreements, INT'L INST.
SUSTAINABILITY DEV. 1 (Aug. 2009), https://perma.cc/WW3A-8E89.

188

See, e.g., Agreement between the United Mexican States and the Republic of Austria on the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, June 29, 1998 (entered into force March 26, 2001). Article 19 of the Mexican-Austria BIT, titled Exclusions,
states that “[t]he disputes settlement provisions ... shall not apply to the resolutions adopted by a Contracting Party which,
for national security reasons, prohibit or restrict the acquisition of an investment in its territory, owned or controlled by its
nationals, by investors of the other Contracting Party, according to the legislation of each Contracting Party.” Id. at art. 19.

189

Case of Regent Company v. Ukraine, App. No. 773/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), https://perma.cc/98RW-L34H; Case of KinStib and Majkic v. Serbia, App. No. 12312/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 85 (2010), https://perma.cc/T2L7-5HMH.

190

See supra note 189; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6(1), Nov. 4,
1950 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) (Article 6(1) states, in pertinent part: “In the determination of []civil rights ..., everyone
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”).

191

See supra notes 189-90.

192

Saipem v. Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh, Decision on Jurisdiction and Provisional Measures, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07
(Mar. 21, 2007) & Award (June 30, 2009).

193

See infra Part IV.B.

194

See Isabel Fernández de la Cuesta, Bilateral Investment Treaties Would Likely Have a Key Role in Mitigating Investment Risks
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